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Abstract
Prices are typically used as proxies for countries' export quality. I relax this strong assumption by
exploiting both price and quantity information to estimate the quality of products exported to the U.S.
Higher quality is assigned to products with higher market shares conditional on price. The estimated
qualities reveal substantial heterogeneity in product markets' scope for quality dierentiation, or their
\quality ladders." I use this variation to explain the heterogeneous impact of low-wage competition on
U.S. manufacturing employment and output. Markets characterized by relatively shorter quality ladders
are associated with larger employment and output declines resulting from low-wage competition.
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1 Introduction
The quality of products manufactured by countries aects many economic outcomes in international and
development economics. Past studies have consistently found that product quality inuences cross-border
trade; richer countries consume and export higher quality products than developing countries.1 The ability
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1Support for the demand-side explanation, initially posited by Linder (1961), has been shown by Hallak (2006) and Verhoogen
(2008). Studies by Hummels and Klenow (2005) and Schott (2004) provide systematic evidence that richer countries export
1of developing countries to transition from low-quality to high-quality products is therefore seen by some as a
necessary (but certainly not a sucient) condition for export success and, ultimately, economic development.2
In addition, quality upgrading features prominently in current debates about the role of international trade
in driving wage inequality. But while this research suggests a positive association between quality upgrading
and income per capita, Verhoogen (2008) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007) argue that quality upgrading
also aects the variance of the income distribution through changes in the relative demand for skilled labor.
Quality specialization may therefore partly explain why inequality has risen in developing countries following
trade liberalizations, in contrast to Stolper-Samuelson predictions. Dierences in the quality space may also
aect how closely countries' products compete with one another and therefore have implications for the
impact of trade on industry employment and output Leamer (2006).
These studies stress the importance of understanding why product quality varies across countries and
over time, and how it is inuenced by policy. The challenge faced by this literature is that product quality is
unobserved. Research in the international trade literature has attempted to deal with this problem by using
prices (or unit values) to proxy for quality. This approach, while convenient, requires strong assumptions
since prices could reect not just quality, but also variations in manufacturing costs. For example, in 1999,
the U.S. imported Malaysian and Portuguese women's trousers (HS 6204624020) at unit values (inclusive
of transportation and tari duties) of $146 and $371, respectively. If prices are assumed to proxy perfectly
for quality, Malaysian trousers would possess about half the quality of Portuguese trousers. However, the
annual wage in the apparel sector for Malaysia and Portugal was $3,100 and $5,700, respectively (UNIDO,
2005). So the dierence in unit values may instead be a reection of these dierent factor prices. Why
would a consumer ever purchase expensive Portuguese trousers if they, in fact, possess lower quality? One
explanation is that a fraction of consumers have a preference for the horizontal attributes of Portuguese
trousers (for instance, the cut or color patterns). Indeed, U.S. consumers imported more than 82,000 dozens
of Malaysian trousers compared to only 865 dozens from Portugal. Idiosyncratic preferences for products'
horizontal attributes can therefore break the direct mapping from prices to quality that has been traditionally
assumed.
This paper estimates the quality of U.S. imports using a procedure that relaxes the strong quality-
equals-price assumption. The quality measures are derived from a nested logit demand system, based on
Berry (1994), that embeds preferences for both horizontal and vertical attributes.3 Quality is the vertical
higher quality products. Baldwin and Harrigan (2007), Hallak and Sivadasan (2009), Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) and Johnson
(2009) also document the role of product quality in inuencing production and trade patterns.
2Kremer (1993) provides microeconomic foundations for the quality production function and its implications for economic
development (see also Verhoogen (2008) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2008)). Endogenous growth models that highlight the
importance of product quality include Grossman and Helpman (1991). Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), Rodrik (2006) and
Hidalgo et al. (2007) highlight the importance of export quality for economic performance.
3Other studies within international trade that use a nested logit structure include Goldberg (1995) and Irwin and Pavcnik
2component of the estimated model and captures the mean valuation that U.S. consumers attach to an im-
ported product. The procedure utilizes both unit value and quantity information to infer quality and has
a straightforward intuition: conditional on price, imports with higher market shares are assigned higher
quality. Importantly, the procedure requires no special data beyond what is readily available in standard
disaggregate trade data. It is also easy to implement; here, I estimate separate demand curves for approxi-
mately hundreds of manufacturing industries. Moreover, the procedure recovers quality at the nest level of
product aggregation available (for the U.S. data, this is the ten-digit HS level).4
The inferred qualities indicate that developed countries export higher quality products relative
to developing countries. This nding is consistent with Schott (2004) who uses unit values to proxy for
quality. However, the estimates also reveal substantial heterogeneity in product markets' scope for quality
dierentiation, or quality ladders, which I measure as the range of qualities within the product market. In
markets with a larger scope for quality dierentiation, or a \long" quality ladder, unit values are relatively
more correlated with the estimated qualities. In these markets, prices appear to be appropriate proxies for
quality. In contrast, prices appear to be less appropriate proxies for quality in markets with a narrow range
of estimated qualities (\short" ladder markets). This provides suggestive evidence that expensive imports in
short-ladder markets coexist with cheaper rivals due to horizontal product dierentiation. That is, although
the average U.S. consumer attaches a low valuation to the expensive import, there is a fraction of consumers
who still value the product. This heterogeneity underscores the drawback in invoking the quality-equals-price
assumption, particularly for products characterized by short quality ladders.
I use this heterogeneity in ladder lengths to demonstrate that quality specialization has important
implications for the U.S. labor market. The public's fear of globalization is often rooted in the vulnerability or,
to use Edward Leamer's terminology, the contestability of jobs. According to Leamer, the contestable jobs are
those where \wages in Los Angeles are set in Shanghai" (Leamer (2006), p. 5). A recent study by Bernard,
Jensen, and Schott (2006) provides evidence that the probability of U.S. plant survival and employment
growth are negatively associated with an industry's exposure to import penetration, particularly from low-
wage countries.5 However, while low-wage competition negatively aects output and employment growth,
the impact is heterogenous across industries. For instance, between 1980 and the mid-1990s, electronics
(SIC 36) experienced greater low-wage import penetration than fabricated metals (SIC 34) but experienced
(2004) although these papers do not focus on the quality of imported products.
4An alternative procedure developed by Hallak and Schott (2007) relies on the similar intuition to infer countries' export
quality to the U.S., but their methodology prevents estimating quality at the nest level of disaggregation due to data limitations.
5Other studies studying the negative relationships between trade and employment include Sachs and Shatz (1994), Free-
man and Katz (1991) and Revenga (1992). Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006) explicitly connect the relationship between
employment and trade with low-wage countries, dened as nations with less than 5 percent of U.S. per capita GDP. I use their
denition of low-wage countries in this paper (see Table 1).
3a smaller employment decline.6
Using a simple model developed in Section 2, I demonstrate that the impact of low-wage competition
on U.S. industries will vary with its quality ladder. My argument is related to a body of research that reject
standard model predictions of factor price equalization (FPE).7 These studies show that if countries inhabit
dierent cones of (quality) diversication, with developing countries exporting low-quality products, then
developed countries will be insulated from movements of wages in developing countries. However, if markets
vary in their scope for quality dierentiation, developed countries will experience heterogeneity in their
exposure to developing countries. In long-ladder markets, developed countries can insulate themselves from
the South by using comparative advantage factors (e.g., skill, capital and/or technology) to specialize atop the
quality ladder. In short-ladder markets, however, developed countries will be directly exposed to Southern
competition because quality upgrading is infeasible. Thus, a market's scope for vertical dierentiation is
important for understanding Leamer's notion of contestable jobs.
I nd robust support for this hypothesis by matching U.S. industry data and import competition to
quality ladders constructed from the estimated qualities. Consistent with Bernard et al. (2006), I nd that
industry employment is negatively associated with import penetration, particularly from low-wage countries.
However, the empirical results conrm that import penetration has a weaker impact on employment in
industries with long quality ladders: a ten percentage point increase in low-wage penetration is associated
with a 6 percent employment decline in an industry characterized by an average quality ladder length. A
similar increase in competition in a long-ladder industry (one standard deviation above the mean) results in
only a 1.4 percent employment decline. Dierential impacts on industry output are similar. Importantly, the
impact of import competition on short and long-ladder industries is similar in magnitude to the dierential
impact on low and high capital-intensive industries. In other words, even after controlling for the dierential
impact through traditional channels, such as capital and skill intensities (see Sachs and Shatz (1994) and
Bernard et al. (2006)), the quality ladder remains an important determinant of an industry's vulnerability
to low-wage competition. Moreover, the heterogenous eect is not precisely captured if one simply uses
variations in unit values.
These results complement the literature studying the relationship between quality specialization and
labor markets. But while existing studies focus predominantly on developing countries (see Goldberg and
Pavcnik (2007), Verhoogen (2008), Kaplan and Verhoogen (2005)), the evidence here suggests that quality
specialization is also important for developed countries. Quality ladders may therefore help identify those
markets that are likely to be contested by competition from low-wage countries.
6One potential explanation is dierences in capital intensity, but in 1980, electronics was less capital intensive than fabricated
metals. Indeed, this paper oers evidence that capital intensity only partly explains the heterogeneity in U.S. employment
outcomes due to import competition.
7For instance, see Leamer (1987) and Schott (2003).
4The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 oers a simple model to illustrate that
exposure to low-wage competition is greater in markets with short quality ladders. In Section 3, I discuss
the approach used to infer quality from trade data. The data and quality estimation results are presented in
Section 4. Section 5 applies the quality estimates to test the implications of quality specialization for U.S.
employment. I conclude in Section 6.
2 A Model of Contestable Jobs
This section develops a simple model that delivers two comparative static results. First, the impact of foreign
competition on domestic market shares is larger from low-wage countries. Second, the impact will depend on
the market's quality ladder length. I then use the empirical quality measures derived in Section 3 to assess
the predictions of the model.
The model is partial equilibrium and analyzes rms in two regions, North (N) and South (S), where
the Southern rms freely export to the North. The wages in each country are determined by an outside sector
and are therefore treated as exogenous: wN > wS. Each region has J homogenous rms that compete by
manufacturing horizontally and vertically distinct varieties. Following Krugman (1980) and Melitz (2003),
horizontal dierentiation is costless so in equilibrium, all rms produce horizontally distinct varieties. But as
in Flam and Helpman (1987), vertical (e.g., quality) dierentiation depends on a Ricardian-type comparative
advantage given by region c's technology, Zc. I assume that Northern rms have access to better technology
than the South: ZN > ZS. Firm j uses this technology to manufacture a variety subject to a marginal cost




2Zc, for c 2 fN;Sg.8
The consumers who live in the North have discrete choice preferences. Consumer n observes the
domestic and Southern varieties and chooses the variety j that provides her with the highest indirect utility,
Vnj = j   pj + nj: (1)
Quality is dened as an attribute whose valuation is agreed upon by all consumers: holding prices xed,
all consumers would prefer higher quality objects. The vertical component can be interpreted as the clarity
or sharpness of a television screen or it can reect the perceived quality that results from advertising. In
either case, quality represents any attribute that enhances consumers' willingness-to-pay for a variety. An
alternative interpretation is that  represents a shift parameter in the variety's demand schedule: holding
price pj xed, demand shifts out when the quality improves (Sutton, 1991). The empirical identication of
quality relies on this latter intuition. The parameter  reects the consumers' valuation for quality and, as
shown below, represents a proxy for the market's quality ladder in the model.
8One can think of this marginal cost function as arising from a xed-proportions technology that combines labor and capital
in the proportion 1 to 2
2Z (with the rental rate on capital being implicitly treated as one).
5Horizontal product dierentiation is introduced in (1) through the consumer-variety-specic term,
nj. Following standard practice in the discrete choice literature, nj is assumed to be distributed i.i.d.
type-I extreme value. Unlike the vertical attribute, the horizontal attribute has the property that some
people prefer it while others do not and on average, it provides zero utility.9 Denote the mean valuation for
variety j as j  j   pj. Under the distributional assumption, the market share of variety j is given by
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A rm from region c maximizes prots in the Northern market by choosing price and quality by












The market is characterized by monopolistic competition with a suciently large number of rms that no










; 8j 2 c (4)
Under this pricing rule, rms charge a markup ( 1
) over their marginal cost. The optimal quality choice





; 8j 2 c (5)
Equations (4) and (5) indicate that all rms within a region choose the same price and quality (but recall that
all rms dierentiate their varieties in the (costless) horizontal dimension). I therefore drop the subscript j
and index the representative rm's choice in each region by N or S. Note also that the market share in (2)
simplies to mc = e
c
J(eN +eS);c 2 fN;Sg and the aggregate market share in each region is Mc = Jmc. The
optimal price and quality choice imply that the mean valuation consumers attach to the representative rm







  wc   1; c 2 fN;Sg: (6)
The Northern rms manufacture the higher quality varieties since ZN > ZS.11 Below, I verify that
more advanced countries indeed export higher quality products using the newly proposed quality measures
9For example, comfort is a quality attribute since, ceteris paribus, all consumers prefer more comfort to less. An article of
clothing's fashion or style is a horizontal attribute since at equal prices, not all consumers would purchase the same style (e.g.,
stripes versus solids).
10If a rm takes into account the impact of its decision on the denominator in (2), the optimal price is given by p
j =
1
(1 mj) + wc +
2
j
2Zc . As discussed in Anderson et al. (1992), monopolistic competition assumes there are a suciently large
number of varieties so that the market share of any one variety is negligible. The optimal price is therefore given by (4).
11Since quality is a monotonic function of technology, prices are sucient statistics for quality in this model. However, if
ZN = ZS, all qualities would be identical, but the North would charge higher prices because of higher manufacturing costs.
Thus, empirically, prices alone may confound dierences in quality and quality-adjusted manufacturing costs.




(ZN   ZS) > (wN   wS); (7)
since this implies that 
N > 
S. This condition in (7) holds if consumers' valuation for quality is suciently
high or the North's technological prowess is sucient to overcome its disadvantage in manufacturing costs.
This assumption is consistent with substantial theoretical and empirical work arguing that higher quality,
or more productive, rms have higher output (and market shares).12
I dene the market's quality ladder as the dierence between the highest and lowest quality (Gross-
man and Helpman, 1991). As discussed below, the empirical measures cannot separately identify  from the






(ZN   ZS): (8)
The market's quality ladder can be indexed by  and so as the valuation for quality increases, the quality
ladder increases, or lengthens. The scope for quality dierentiation will therefore vary according the con-
sumers' valuations for quality in each market.13 Moreover, as the quality ladder increases, the market share









This simple model abstracts away from the endogenous \lengthening" of the ladder that may occur
in a long-run equilibrium with technological progress or shifts in consumer preferences. Instead, I assume that
the quality ladder is xed which may be appropriate in the short to medium run and mitigate endogeneity
concerns in the empirical analysis by assigning a market's quality ladder its initial length. This assumption
is consistent with the data which reports a persistence between a market's initial ladder length and its nal
period length. That is, on average, markets with initially \short" ladders are not \long" by the end of the
sample, implying that the quality ladder length is an intrinsic attribute of a market characterizing its scope
for quality dierentiation.14
I can now analyze how the aggregate Northern market share changes with Southern wages, and how
this impact varies according to a market's quality ladder length. The rst result shows that the North loses













12For instance, see Melitz (2003) and Bernard et al. (2007).
13The ladder length could also vary by changing ZN and the predictions of the model do not change. Hence, the contestable
jobs hypothesis does not hinge on the source of the market's scope for quality dierentiation.
14A market's intrinsic scope for quality dierentiation is closely related to escalation principle developed in Sutton (1998).
7Thus, Southern rms become more competitive as its manufacturing costs falls and this gain comes at
the expense of lower market shares for the Northern rms. This comparative static is quite intuitive and
is supported by existing empirical evidence. For instance, Bernard et al. (2006) show that output and
employment for U.S. plants are negatively associated with import competition, but the impact is much
larger when import competition originates from countries with less than 5% of U.S. per capita GDP.
Importantly, this model adds quality dierentiation to show that the intensity of competition within
a market depends on the quality ladder length. In particular, while (9) indicates that the North's market
share falls as Southern wages decline, it suers a smaller loss in markets characterized by longer quality




















































=  MNMS (MN   MS)(ZN   ZS) < 0; (11)
since MN > MS. This derivative shows that in long-ladder markets (high ), the sensitivity of Northern
market shares to Southern competitiveness is reduced. As a result, a decrease in the South's wage results in
a smaller decline of the North's market share in long ladders.
The model shows that trading with the South can generate a dierential impact on two markets
that are otherwise identical but vary according in their quality ladders. This result is related to more
general models of international trade that predict a breakdown of FPE when countries are fully specialized
in production. In contrast to a single-cone equilibrium, where endowments are such that all countries produce
all goods, the conditions required for factor price equalization are not met in multi-cone equilibrium because
countries specialize in varieties tailored to their endowments.15 Schott (2004) has extended this analysis to
within product specialization where endowment dierences cause countries to specialize in dierent segments
of a product's quality ladder. The model here sharpens this analysis by arguing that the scope for quality
specialization varies across markets.
3 Empirical Implementation
This section describes the procedure that infers quality using price and quantity information from standard
disaggregate trade data. The estimated qualities are then used to verify predictions from the model.
15For evidence in favor of the hypothesis that countries inhabit multiple cones of diversication, see Leamer (1987), Davis
and Weinstein (2001) and Schott (2003).
8The methodology is based on the nested logit framework by Berry (1994). The nested logit has the
advantage over the logit in (1) because it partially relaxes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
property by allowing for more plausible correlation structures among consumer preferences. To understand
why this is important, suppose a consumer is choosing between a Japanese wool shirt and an Italian cotton
shirt. If a Chinese cotton shirt enters the market, a logit or CES framework would predict that the market
shares for both imports would fall by the same percent. However, we might expect the Italian cotton shirt's
market share to adjust more than the Japanese shirt because the Chinese shirt is also cotton. The nested
logit allows for more appropriate substitution patterns by placing varieties into appropriate nests.
In order to delineate the nests, I rely on the structure of the U.S. trade data. Feenstra et al. (2002)
have compiled U.S. import data which contain ve-digit SITC industries that have been mapped to ten-digit
HS products denoted by h. The products serve as the nests. An import from country c within a product is
called a variety.
I model consumer preferences for a single industry and therefore suppress industry subscripts. Fol-
lowing Berry (1994), consumer n has preferences for country c's import into HS product h (e.g., variety ch)
at time t. The consumer purchases the one variety that provides her with the highest indirect utility, given
by
Vncht = 1;ch + 2;t + 3;cht   pcht +
H X
h=1
nhtdch + (1   )ncht: (12)
Quality is dened as 1;ch + 2;t + 3;cht since it reects the valuation for variety ch that is common across
consumers (notice that these terms are not subscripted by n). This quality term is decomposed into three
components. The rst term, 1;ch, is the time-invariant valuation that the consumer attaches to variety ch.
The second term, 2;t, captures for secular time trends common across all varieties. The 3;cht term is a
variety-time deviation from the xed eect that is observed by the consumer but not the econometrician.
This last term is potentially correlated with the variety's c.i.f. unit value, pcht.
The horizontal component of the model is captured by the random component,
PH
h=1 nhtdch+(1 
)ncht. The logit error ncht is assumed to be distributed Type-I extreme value and explains why a variety
that is expensive and has low quality is ever purchased. The former term interacts the common valuation
that consumer n places on all varieties within product h, nht, with a dummy variable dch that takes a value
of 1 if country c's export lies in product h. This term generates the nest structure because if allows consumer
n's preferences to be more correlated for varieties within product h than for varieties across products.16
An \outside" variety completes the demand system. The purpose of the outside variety is to allow
16As discussed in Berry (1994), Cardell (1997) has shown that the distribution of
PH
h=1 nhtdch is the unique distribution
such that if  is distributed extreme value, then the sum is also distributed type-I extreme value. The degree of within nest
correlation is controlled by  2 (0;1]. As  approaches one, the correlation in consumer tastes for varieties within a nest
approaches one and as  tends to zero, the nested logit converges to the standard logit model.
9consumers the possibility to not purchase any of the inside varieties. For instance, consumers may choose
to purchase a domestic variety (or not simply not make any purchase) if the price of all imports rises. The
utility of the outside variety is given by
un0t = 1;0 + 2;t + 3;0t   p0t + n0t + (1   )n0t: (13)
The mean utility of the outside variety is normalized to zero; this normalization anchors the valuations of
the inside varieties. In the context here, one can think of the outside variety as the domestic substitute for
imports, and I therefore set the outside variety market share to one minus the industry's import penetration.17
Note that the choice of the outside variety proxy aects the absolute growth rate of import qualities but
not the relative growth rate because the estimation includes year xed eects that are common to all
varieties. Once the outside variety market share (s0t) is known, I can compute the total industry output:
MKTt =
P
ch6=0 qcht=(1   s0t), where qcht denotes the import quantity of variety ch. The imported variety
market shares are then calculated as scht = qcht=MKTt.
The consumer chooses variety ch if Vncht > Vnc0h0t. Under the distributional assumptions for the
random component of consumer utility, Berry (1994) has shown that the demand curve implied by the
preferences in (12) is
ln(scht)   ln(s0t) = 1;ch + 2;t + pcht +  ln(nscht) + 3;cht; (14)
where scht is variety ch's overall market share and nscht is its market share within product h (the nest
share).18
Since the trade data do not record detailed characteristics of varieties, I exploit the panel dimen-
sion of the data by specifying a time-invariant component of quality (1;ch) with variety xed eects, and
the common quality component (2;t) with year xed eects. This implies that the quality measure can-
not separate the technology of the variety from the consumers' valuation for quality. However, Section 2
demonstrated that separately identifying the channel is not important for the model's predictions. The third
component of quality, 3;cht, is not observed and plays the role of the estimation error. Since 3;cht and the
17Bernard et al. (2006) provide SIC-level import penetration from 1989-1996. I obtain import penetration from 1997-2001 at
the NAICS level (I thank Spencer Amdur for constructing these data). Since I run the estimations at the SITC level, I map
the import penetration values to the SITC (rev. 2) level.
18If one adopts a logit demand system, the nest share disappears from equation (14). To understand why nesting may be
important for inferring quality, re-consider the example discussed above. Suppose that the Japanese wool and Italian cotton
shirts are identical in every dimension (including price) and evenly split the market. We would infer their qualities also to be
equal. Now suppose an identical Chinese cotton shirt enters. If preferences are more correlated within a nest, the new market
shares for both cotton shirts would be 1/4 each and the Japanese wool shirt would capture the remaining 1/2. However, we do
not want the inferred quality of the existing varieties to fall simply because varieties within nests are closer substitutes than
varieties across nests. The nested logit alleviates this concern because the nest share (nscht) adjusts to account for the changes
in market shares simply due to correlated preferences.
10nest share are potentially correlated with the variety's price, instrumental variables are required to identify
the parameters.
3.1 Identication and Hidden Varieties
Identifying the price coecient in (14) typically relies on rival variety characteristics as instruments (Berry,
Levinsohn, and Pakes, 1995). Yet even if variety characteristics were available in the import data, the
assumption of exogenous characteristics may be problematic if rms simultaneously choose prices and char-
acteristics (as in the model). Fortunately, the import data provide variety-specic unit transportation costs
that can serve as instruments for the c.i.f. price. Although transportation costs are obviously correlated
with c.i.f. prices, one may be concerned that they are correlated with quality because of the \Washington
Apples" eect: distant countries may ship higher quality goods in order to lower per unit transport costs
(Hummels and Skiba, 2004). This raises concerns that trade costs may be correlated with a variety's qual-
ity. However, the exclusion restriction remains valid as long as transportation costs do not aect deviations
from average quality, 3;cht. In other words, if an Australian rm chooses to export higher quality varieties
to the U.S. because of distance, the instruments remain valid as long as shocks to transportation costs do
not aect deviations from the rm's average quality choice. Indeed, the Washington Apples phenomenon in
Hummels and Skiba (2004) identify the impact of distance on prices using cross-country variation in distance
rather than variation in transportation costs over time.19 I also include exchange rates and the interaction
of distance to the U.S. with oil prices as additional instruments; these instruments vary at the country-year
level.
The nscht is also endogenous and so to identify , I instrument this term with the number of varieties
within product h and the number of varieties exported by country c. These count measures will be correlated
with the nest term and uncorrelated with 3;cht if variety entry and exit occur prior to exporting rms' quality
choice. This assumption is now standard in the literature that estimates discrete choice demands curves (e.g.,
see Berry et al. (1995)).20
A second issue that arises in estimating (14) is that the market shares are likely to be an aggregation
of even more nely classied imports. As noted in Feenstra (1994), a country's large market share may
simply reect the fact that it exports more unobserved or hidden varieties within a product. To illustrate
this potential problem, suppose that China and Italy export identical varieties at identical prices and split
the market equally at the (unobserved) twelve-digit level, but that China exports more twelve-digit varieties
(such as more colors). Aggregation to the observed ten-digit level would assign a larger market share at
19In Section 5.1.1, I show that the results are also robust to including unit tari costs as instruments.
20Moreover, the model above is developed under monopolistic competition where a rm's quality choice is chosen indepen-
dently of the actions (and number) of its competitors.
11identical prices to China. From (14), China's estimated quality would be biased upward simply due to the
hidden varieties. I therefore follow predictions from Krugman (1980), among others, and use a country's
population to proxy for countries' hidden varieties.21 The demand curve that adjusts for the hidden varieties
is given by
ln(scht)   ln(s0t) = 1;ch + 2;t + pcht +  ln(nscht) +  lnpopct + 3;cht (15)
where popct is the population of country c. I estimate separate demand curves in (15) for each industry.
The quality of variety ch at time t is dened using the estimated parameters:
cht  ^ 1;ch + ^ 2;t + ^ 3;cht: (16)
Equation (15) shows that inferring quality relies on the intuitive idea that the quality of an imported variety
is its relative market share after controlling for exporter size and price. Thus, a variety's quality will rise
if its price can rise without losing market share. While it is possible that many factors could aect market
shares, it is important to note that this set is made much smaller by conditioning on prices. For example, a
variety may have a large market share if the exporting country is geographically close to U.S. However, the
price includes transportation costs and therefore the quality estimate is not capturing purely gravity eects
such as distance. A similar argument can be made regarding free trade agreements: even though Mexican
and Canadian import shares are high because of NAFTA, this eect will operate through prices, which are
inclusive of taris.22
4 Data and Quality Estimation Results
I estimate regression (15) on U.S. product-level import data from 1989-2001 (Feenstra et al., 2002). In
addition to import quantities and values, the data record taris and transportation costs. A variety's unit
value is dened as the sum of the value, total duties and transportation costs divided by the import quantity
and deated to real values using the CPI. I restrict the sample to the manufacturing industries (SITC 5-8)
and exclude the homogenous goods dened by Rauch (1999) since these products, by denition, exhibit no
quality dierentiation. Since the import data are extremely noisy (General Accounting Oce, 1995), I trim
the data along two dimensions. The rst trim excludes all varieties that report a quantity of one unit or a
total value of less than $7,500 in 1989 dollars. The second trim removes varieties with extreme unit values
that fall below the 5th percentile or above the 95th percentile within the industry.23
21In Section 5.1.1, I show that the results are robust to using GDP as the proxy for hidden varieties.
22Note that dening quality based on residuals is analogous to the literature that infers total factor productivity from rm-
level estimations. If one remains concerned about what the residual 3;cht captures, I show that the results are not sensitive to
excluding the residual from the denition of quality in Section 5.1.1.
2312 percent of the SITC industries record imports in multiple units. For these industries, the products of the majority unit
are kept which comprise about 80 percent of the observations within a multiple-unit industry. Baseline results are not sensitive
12Table 2 reports basic summary statistics by two-digit SIC sectors. Column 1 indicates the number
of industries and column 2 reports the total number of products. Column 3 reports the (weighted) average
income per capita by sector; the average apparel and leather imports originate from countries with lowest
average per capita income while imports into transportation, industrial machinery and chemicals are dom-
inated by relatively richer countries. Columns 4 and 5 report skill and capital intensity from the NBER
Manufacturing Industry Database (Bartelsman et al., 1996).
The estimating equation in (15) is run separately for 1,059 SITC (rev. 2) manufacturing industries
with standard errors clustered by exporting country. The results of these regressions are summarized in
Table 3. The bottom panel shows that 71 percent of the regressions, or 81 percent of the total 1.245 million
observations in the entire sample, have a negative and statistically signicant price coecient. Rows 1 and
2 in the top panel indicate that the average IV price coecient is about 68 percent lower than the OLS price
coecient, suggesting that the instruments are moving the price coecient in the intuitive direction. Row
3 reports summary statistics for the own-price elasticities. While the average own price elasticity is low,
this is not surprising given that the parameters in (15) are estimated using variation within varieties over
time. Rows 4-6 indicate that the average and median regression pass the overidentifying restrictions test and
have low rst-stage F-statistic p-values. Row 7 reports the coecients on population. Row 8 reports that
57 percent of the estimations report a statistically signicant ^  indicating the appropriateness of the nested
logit structure. Row 9 reports that the quality estimates are precisely estimated, which is not surprising
since these estimates are the sum of two xed eects plus a residual.24
4.1 Factor Endowments and Quality Specialization
The inferred qualities oer support for previous studies that have found, using prices to proxy for quality, that
more capital- and skill-intensive countries export higher quality varieties (e.g., see Schott (2004) or Hallak
(2006)). This relationship is seen in the following specication which relates export quality to exporters' per
capita income GDP per capita
cht = ht +  lnYct + cht; (17)
where cht is the estimated quality of country c's export in product h at time t and Yct is country c's
per capita GDP. The inclusion of a product-year dummy, ht, indicates that the regression considers the
cross-sectional relationship between quality and income within products. Table 4 reports that the coecient
on exporter income is positive and signicant. Richer countries, on average, export higher quality varieties
within products. Columns 2 and 3 re-run (17) using capital-labor ratios and the fraction of a country's
workforce with tertiary education. The coecient on capital-labor endowment is positive and signicant, so
to varying price cutos or trimming observations below $5,000 or $10,000.
24The standard errors are obtained by simulating draws from the asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameters.
13more capital intensive countries also tend to export higher quality varieties within products. The coecient
on the education variable is positive, but not statistically signicant, but the precision may be low due to
lack of data.
These results are consistent with the model's prediction that more advanced countries will manu-
facture higher quality products. This specication can also be used to check the importance of correcting
for exporter size when inferring quality from market shares and prices. Column 4 re-runs (17) using quality
estimates that have not been adjusted for hidden varieties (that is, qualities estimated from (14) rather than
(15)). Notice now that there is essentially no relationship between exporter income and the unadjusted qual-
ity estimates. The main reason why this occurs is China. When controlling for hidden varieties, the quality
estimates report that China's export quality is below average. However, the unadjusted quality estimates
indicate that China has above average quality. This is seen in column 5 which includes a China dummy
in the regression of unadjusted quality estimates on exporter income, and the coecient on income is now
similar to column 1. These results illustrate the importance of controlling for hidden varieties when inferring
quality from price and quantity information.25
4.2 Quality Ladders
I construct the quality ladder from the estimated qualities as the dierence between the maximum and




Regression (17) provides evidence that richer countries sit atop the quality ladder. The quality ladder will
change over time as countries increase R&D expenditure and/or gain access to improved technology. To
mitigate endogeneity concerns, I x the product's quality ladder at the length measured in the rst period
that the product appears in the sample.26 One concern of xing the quality ladder is that \short" ladders
could become \long" or vice versa. However, there is persistence in a product's ladder length over time.
The correlation coecient between a product's initial ladder length and its end of sample length is 0.7. This
suggests that the scope for quality dierentiation is an intrinsic feature of products.
In a vertical product market, Bresnahan (1993) has shown that prices and quality are isomorphic
since all consumers agree on the rankings of goods. However, as discussed earlier, the mapping between
prices and quality is less clear when products also possess horizontal attributes. The following specication
25Feenstra (1994) and Hallak and Schott (2007) have made a similar point.
26The main results of the paper actually rely on the inter-decile range which is more robust to outliers than the range. In
Section 5.1.1, I show that the results are robust to dening the ladder using the full range, the inter-quartile range and the
standard deviation of qualities.
14assesses the relationship between the inferred qualities and prices across products of varying ladder lengths
lnpcht = ht + 1cht + 2 (cht  lnLadderh) + cht: (19)
pcht is the unit value of country c's export in product h at time t and ht denote product-year xed
eects. Column 1 of Table 5 reports that the interaction coecient, 2, is positive and signicant.27 This
regression shows that in markets characterized by long quality ladders, there is a relatively steeper gradient
between prices and the estimated qualities. This is consistent with the quality-equals-price assumption
frequently made in the literature. However, this correlation weakens as the ladder length declines implying
that prices may be imperfect proxies for quality in short-ladder markets. Regression (19) therefore indicates
that the average consumer does not attach a high valuation to expensive imports in short-ladder products.
For example, the estimated qualities reveal that while Canadian footwear is 27 percent more expensive
than average imported footwear, it has below average quality. Horizontal attributes can explain why these
expensive, but low quality, Canadian shoes are purchased. Thus, inferring quality from prices alone would
instead attach a high quality rank for Canadian footwear.
Two graphs further illustrate this point. Figure 1 plots the relationship between quantities, unit
values and the estimated qualities for two products: \Transmission Receivers Exceeding 400 MHZ" (HS
8525203080) and \Footwear with Plastic Soles, Leather Uppers" (HS 6403999065). The graphs are ordered
by unit values, which also roughly correspond to exporter per capita GDP. For transmission receivers (top
panel), unit values and quality are positively correlated, indicating that the average consumer assigns a higher
valuation to more expensive varieties. For this product, it appears that the quality-equals-price assumption
is tenable.
The bottom panel plots leather shoes. Here, exporters of expensive varieties, like Belgium, are
associated with relatively low quality. The reason lies in the export quantities (square dots). Belgium has a
very low market share, even conditioning on its price. Taking into account Belgium's market share and export
price, the quality estimates indicate that the average consumer attaches a low valuation to Belgian leather
shoes. On the other hand, France exported the second most expensive variety in this HS classication and
obtained a relatively high market share given its price; it is therefore assigned a high quality estimate. China
also has a high estimated quality since, conditional on its price, it also has a high market share. Consistent
with casual evidence, footwear exported by Spain, Italy and Germany are of relatively high quality: these
countries' footwear are expensive but secure high market shares. These two gures therefore suggest that
the direct mapping from prices to quality may be more reasonable for some product markets rather than
others.
27Note that the negative 1 coecient is a consequence of how quality is dened (see equation (15)): conditional on market
shares, price and the estimated quality measures are positively correlated.
15Conceptually, the quality ladder (a proxy for vertical dierentiation) and the CES elasticity of sub-
stitution (the measure of horizontal dierentiation in standard trade models) appear related. In column 2 of
Table 5, I include the interaction of quality with the elasticities of substitution estimated by Broda and We-
instein (2006).28 The interaction coecient is not signicant suggesting no systematic relationship between
prices and qualities according to the elasticity of substitution. There are several potential explanations for
this nding. First, the logit and CES demand systems only yield identical aggregate demand curves if prices
and income are in logs (see Anderson et al. (1987)). Perhaps more importantly, our estimation methods
dier substantially. The approach here relies on supply-shifters to identify the demand curve. In contrast,
Broda and Weinstein (2006) assume that the demand and supply curve error terms are uncorrelated and
use heteroskedasticity to identify the parameters. Moreover, they rely on variation across varieties within
a product, while the estimations here use within-variety variation. Their methodology also constrains their
estimates to lie within an interval. So while conceptually similar, the quality ladder and elasticities from
Broda and Weinstein (2006) are dicult to compare in practice.
Finally, it is important to note that the quality ladders are constructed from not only from developing
country imports, but also imports from highly developed countries like Japan, Germany and Canada. The
quality ladder is therefore likely to represent the true quality frontier of a product. But while most countries
export apparel and footwear products, there is a negative correlation between the average number of varieties
within an HS product and industry capital intensity. Based on equation (15), a country's variety has zero
market share if consumers assign a negative innite consumer valuation (or if the price is innite). In the next
section, I demonstrate that quality ladder lengths are positively correlated with industry capital intensity.
Putting these two ndings together indicates that the selection bias that occurs because not all countries
export more capital-intensive products will underestimate the quality ladder for these products. As a result,
accounting for the selection bias (e.g., see Helpman et al. (2006)) is not a major concern since the selection
bias works against the results below. In other words, the quality ladders are underestimated for the markets
that are least aected by low-wage competition.
5 Long and Short Quality Ladders
5.1 Quality Ladders and U.S. Manufacturing Employment
With the quality ladders in hand, I can now examine the contestable jobs hypothesis outlined in Section 2
by linking the impact of import penetration on U.S. manufacturing employment with the quality ladder.
Since U.S. employment data is unavailable at the 10-digit HS level, I construct a four-digit SIC (rev. 1987)
industry quality ladder, IndLadderm, to match to industry-level U.S. employment data. The industry ladder
28I exclude extremely large elasticities of substitution (above the 90th percentile, or elasticities greater than 76.9).





where Hm denotes the number of products in SIC industry m, Ladderh is the product's baseline ladder
(dened in (18)). The variable wh is the product's (real) import share within an SIC in the product's initial
year. Again, by relying on initial year values, the industry ladder becomes a time invariant measure.
Summary statistics for the quality ladders are shown in the nal column of Table 2. Table 6 examines
how standard industry characteristics correlate with the quality ladder. Column 1 regresses the industry
quality ladder in (20) on skill intensity, capital intensity and total factor productivity.29 The results report
a positive and statistically signicant correlation with capital intensity and TFP, suggesting that capital-
intensive and high productivity industries are also associated with longer quality ladders. Column 2 includes
measures of marketing expenses and R&D taken from the 1975 FTC Line of Business survey.30 The quality
ladders have a positive and signicant correlation with the R&D measure but not the marketing expense
variable. So while the quality measures cannot directly separate consumer valuation from technology, this
regression suggests that the variation is driven predominantly the latter.
In column 3, I correlate the quality ladder with a measure of price dispersion and the Broda and
Weinstein elasticities.31 Both measures report no statistically signicant correlation with the quality ladder.
So while the price dispersion measure is positively correlated with the quality ladder, the correlation is
noisy. This is consistent with earlier arguments that price dispersion may be more appropriate proxies for
quality in some markets rather than others. Finally, column 4 includes all observable industry characteristics.
The capital intensity and R&D intensity measure remain positive and statistically signicant (p-value on
R&D coecient is .108). One interesting feature of these regressions is that the R-squareds are extremely
low. Thus, most of the variation in quality ladders cannot be explained by these widely used industry
characteristics.
Following Bernard et al. (2006), I link employment outcomes with two measures of import penetra-
tion: imports originating from countries with less than 5 percent of U.S. per capita GDP (LWPEN) and
the rest of the world (OTHPEN). Total import penetration is dened as Imt=(Imt + Qmt   Xmt), where
Imt is the value of imports in four-digit SIC industry m at time t, Qmt is the industry's domestic production
and Xmt represents U.S. exports. LWPEN is the product of total import penetration and the value share
29Skill intensity is measured as the ratio of non-production to production workers. Capital intensity is the ratio of capital
stock to total employment. See (Bartelsman et al., 1996) for details on the measurement of total factor productivity.
30These two measures have been used by Kugler and Verhoogen (2008), Sutton (1998) and Antras (2003) to measure the
importance of marketing expenses and R&D for an industry.
31I aggregate the product-level elasticities and the product-level unit value dispersion (the coecient of variation) to the
industry level using (20). The Broda-Weinstein elasticities are not available for all products so I assign missing values with
average elasticities over coarser HS codes.




Imt + Qmt   Xmt
: (21)




Imt + Qmt   Xmt
: (22)
The following specication, which is an industry-level regression based on Bernard et al. (2006),
regresses employment outcomes on the quality ladder and import penetration
lnEmpmt = m + t + 1OTHPENmt + 2LWPENmt + 3 (LWPENmt  lnIndLadderm) + mt: (23)
Note that the specication includes both industry (m) and year (t) xed eects. If the data are consistent
with the comparative static prediction in (9), we should observe 2 < 1 < 0; higher import penetration is
negatively correlated with industry employment, and the correlation is stronger with low-wage penetration.
The second prediction of the model is that impact of low-wage penetration will depend on the quality
ladder (see (11)). The interaction between LWPEN and IndLadder captures this eect. The prediction
is that 3 > 0 implying that long-ladder industries with high exposure to low-wage countries suer smaller
employment declines.32
Column one of Table 7 reports the baseline results. The coecients are statistically signicant
and have the predicted signs. Import penetration negatively aects employment, and imports from low-
wage countries have a larger impact than imports originating from the remaining (richer) countries. The
interaction coecient is positive and precisely estimated, supporting the model's prediction that vulnerability
to low-wage penetration declines in industries with longer quality ladders.
The point estimates are also economically signicant. If low-wage penetration increases by ten
percentage points, employment in an average ladder industry declines by 6 percent. In contrast, low-wage
penetration is associated with only a 1.4 percent employment loss in a long-ladder industry (one standard
deviation above the mean). For a specic example, if LWPEN were to increase by ten percentage points
in the household slippers industry (SIC 3142), employment would fall 13 percent more than in household
audio and video equipment (SIC 3651), an industry characterized by a three times longer quality ladder.
In column two, I include a ladder-OTHPEN interaction to determine if the eects of imports
originating from more-advanced countries are also dampened in long ladders. This interaction is statistically
signicant, but its economic magnitude is smaller than the ladder-LWPEN interaction term.
Given that the quality ladder is positively correlated with industry capital intensity and TFP (see
Table 6), one concern is that the quality ladder simply proxies these variables. If this is true, then the results
32Note that the predictions for the signs of 1;2;3 are opposite from the model because in the model, an increase in wages
is analogous to a decline in LWPEN.
18in columns one and two simply conrm the ndings of previous studies arguing that, for instance, more
capital-intensive industries are less susceptible to import competition. To address this concern, I include
the interaction of initial industry capital-intensity with LWPEN in column three.33 More capital-intensive
industries are less vulnerable to low-wage imports, as expected, but the quality ladder interaction remains
positive and signicant. Moreover, the magnitudes of the point estimates are about the same. Employment
in a short-ladder is predicted to fall 4.5 percent more, ceteris paribus, than its long-ladder counterpart.
Likewise, a low capital-intensive industry would contract 8 percent more than a highly intensive industry
due to low-wage competition. Column 4 interacts initial industry TFP with LWPEN and the results
continue to hold. Finally, (unreported) results are also robust to including both capital-intensity and TFP
interactions.
While using the initial-period ladder and factor intensities mitigate endogeneity concerns, import
penetration may be endogenous. For instance, international trade may be lling a void created by a decline
in domestic industries caused by other factors, such as structural changes in the economy. The simultaneity
would bias the import penetration coecients downward in (23). I therefore instrument the penetration
measures with industry-year weighted averages of exchange rates, where the weights are the country's share
of industry value in 1989, for low-wage countries and the rest of the world. Taris and freight rates also
serve as instruments. These two instruments are constructed by dividing total duties and freight costs for
each set of countries divided by their total import value for each industry and year.
Column 5 of Table 7 presents the baseline IV specication. The rst column shows the baseline
specication. Instrumenting actually causes the coecient on LWPEN to increase in magnitude, which
suggests measurement error in the variable.34 The quality ladder now generates an even larger impact of
competition on employment. For example, a ten percentage point increase in LWPEN leads to a 9 percent
employment decline in a short-ladder industry (one standard deviation below the mean) compared to a 27
percent employment gain in the average industry. While 3 is not signicant at conventional levels when
including the OTHPEN  lnIndLadder interaction in column 6, the magnitude and signs are consistent
with earlier results. Column 7 includes the interaction of low-wage penetration with industry capital intensity
and the point estimates imply that employment in a short-ladder is predicted to fall 23 percent more, ceteris
paribus, than its long-ladder counterpart while a low capital-intensive industry would contract 19 percent
more than a highly capital-intensive industry. Column 8 shows that the result is robust to allowing for
a heterogenous response across industries with dierent TFP, and (unreported) results are also robust to
allowing for both capital and TFP interactions in the regression. These ndings indicate that even industries
33Since this variable is itself endogenous, the regression assigns an industry's capital intensity at its initial period level. This
implies that the coecient on capital intensity is not identied because of the industry xed eects.
34Bernard et al. (2006) also nd that instrumenting import penetration causes the magnitude of the coecients to increase
in their employment regressions.
19with similar observable characteristics may exhibit heterogenous impacts from international trade because
of inherent dierences in vertical specialization.
The point estimates suggest large impacts, but they are consistent with an argument emphasized by
Leamer (2000): even low import volumes can have a signicant impact on U.S. rms if international trade
equalizes product prices. The results indicate this argument is particularly salient for short-ladder products.
Indeed, the extent to which domestic goods overlap with foreign goods, and the source of the foreign imports,
is precisely what determines which industries are vulnerable to competition in the framework here. The
magnitude of the employment eects are also consistent with Bernard et al. (2006), whose conservative
estimates indicate that a ten percentage point increase in LWPEN raises the probability of U.S. plant
death by 17 percent. Moreover, the raw data reveal large correlations between employment outcomes and
rising low-wage import penetration. For example, the household slippers industry's quality ladder is about
two-thirds of the average and between 1989 and 1996, employment fell more than 50 percent while low-wage
penetration simultaneously rose 25 percentage points. Import competition therefore can have large impacts
on domestic rms in short-ladder industries.
Finally, Table 8 reruns (23) with industry output as the dependent variable to show that employment
outcomes are not simply an artifact of U.S. rms substituting labor with capital. The table shows that
the Ladder interaction is positive and signicant across all specications (excluding columns 6) and the
magnitudes are comparable with the employment regressions. For example, using the point estimates in
column one, the impact of low-wage penetration on output growth in a short- versus long-ladder is 5 percent
more. Thus, the results oer strong evidence that long-ladder industries contract less than short-ladder
industries given the same level of low-wage import penetration.
5.1.1 Robustness Checks
I perform a number of robustness exercises to check the sensitivity of the results. The rst check re-runs
the IV specications using two-digit SIC-year pair xed eects. This specication controls for sector-specic
shocks that may be correlated with the quality ladder and the results for employment and output are reported
in Table 9. The magnitude of the coecients declines, not surprisingly, yet the interaction coecients remain
statistically signicant. Thus, the results are robust to a very exible specication that uses only within-
sector variation to identify heterogenous eects of import competition across quality ladder lengths.
The next set of robustness checks re-run the baseline specication in (23) using alternative measures
of the quality ladder. Each row of Table 10 reports the LWPEN-Ladder coecient from the OLS and IV
employment regressions. The rst sensitivity check addresses the Washington Apples concern that while
transport costs are correlated with c.i.f. prices, they may be correlated with the unobserved portion of
quality, 3;cht (see discussion in Section 3.1). The rst row of Table 10 addresses this concern by including
20per-unit taris as an additional instrument and the results on the ladder interaction are robust in both the
OLS and IV specications.
Constructing the quality ladders hinges on the disaggregate detail of U.S. import data. One concern
might be that the ladder lengths simply reect aggregation dierences if products in some industries are
dened more coarsely than others. Another worry could be that the product-level ladders just proxy for
the number of countries exporting that product code. To ensure that the results are not sensitive to these
concerns, rows 2 and 3 re-run the employment regressions using these count denitions of the ladder. The
second row denes the product-level ladder as the number of countries (varieties) within the product and
then aggregates to the industry level according to (20). Row 3 counts the number of products within the
four-digit industry code to construct the industry-level ladder. Both measures proxy potential dierences in
the coarseness of product denitions across industries. However, the OLS and IV coecients are imprecisely
measured. This provides evidence that the baseline results are not driven by the coarseness of data.
Empirical studies typically use unit values to proxy for quality. Table 6 demonstrated that while price
dispersion is associated with the quality ladder, the correlation is noisy. This is consistent with evidence that
prices may be better proxies for quality in only markets characterized by a high degree of vertical product
dierentiation. In Row 4 of Table 10, I use this alternative price-based quality ladder to assess the model
predictions. The interaction coecient is positive for both the OLS and IV specications, which is consistent
with the model's predictions, but only the IV result is signicant at conventional levels. Row 5 of Table 10
takes the opposite approach and constructs the ladder using within-product market share dispersion. While
the OLS coecient is statistically signicant, the IV coecient, which accounts for potential endogeneity
concerns, is very imprecisely estimated. This is not surprising; high quality is not assigned to products
simply with high market shares, but rather high market shares conditional on price.
Row 6 denes quality exclusive of the residual from the estimating equation in (15), cht = ^ 1;ch +
^ 2;t, and then constructs the industry ladder using (18) and (20). This measure addresses potential concerns
that the residual term (3;cht) may be capturing factors other than quality. However, the table shows that
the results are robust to dening quality without this term.
Row 7 of Table 10 constructs the quality ladder for quality estimates obtained from specication
(15) where population is replaced by GDP as the proxy for exporter size. The results are not sensitive to
using this alternative proxy, either.
The next robustness check uses the dispersion measure constructed from the Broda and Weinstein
elasticities. The OLS coecient in row 8 is signicant at the 10 percent level and has an intuitive sign:
industries with higher substitutability experience relatively smaller employment growth. However, the IV
coecient is not statistically signicant. The nding that the results are noisy is not surprising given the
earlier results that show no systematic relationship between the quality ladders and the Broda and Weinstein
21elasticities substitution. Moreover, the Broda-Weinstein measure becomes statistically insignicant if I also
include the quality ladder interaction, which remains positive and statistically signicant. This is further
evidence that exposure to low-wage competition is more sensitive to dierences in vertical, rather than
horizontal, dierentiation.
The unit values used in the baseline regressions do not control for non-tari barriers, such as volun-
tary export restraints or quotas, due to data limitations. The major non-tari barriers during this period
were quotas imposed on textile and apparel imports under the Multiber Arrangement (MFA) and its succes-
sor, the Agreement on Textile and Clothing (ATC). I therefore re-run the regressions using industry quality
ladders that exclude products that were covered by the MFA/ATC. These HS codes are obtained from
Brambilla, Khandelwal, and Schott (2008). Row 9 indicates that the results are not sensitive to excluding
products that were subject to import quotas.
Finally, the remaining rows of Table 10 construct quality ladders using alternative measures of
dispersion: range, inter-quartile range and the standard deviation of the estimated qualities. All coecients
in both the OLS and IV regressions are positive and statistically signicant. In short, this section shows
that the heterogenous impact of low-wage penetration across industries of varying quality ladders is robust
to several critiques and alternative measures of industries' quality ladders.
6 Conclusion
This paper develops a procedure to infer the quality of countries' exports to the U.S. Rather than restricting
the inference to just prices, as is typically the case, I incorporate both price and market share information to
construct a measure of quality that accounts for both horizontal and vertical dierentiation. While obviously
more complicated than simply using prices, the method suggests that the scope for quality dierentiation
varies substantially across products. Thus, products with large variation in prices could nonetheless possess
little dierences in quality.
I illustrate the importance of heterogeneity in the scope for quality dierentiation by revisiting the
impact of trade on U.S. industry outcomes. The model predicts that if countries are unable to exploit
comparative-advantage factors to manufacture vertically superior goods, employment and output in these
products is likely to shift to lower cost countries. I nd support for this theory by matching the quality
ladders to U.S. industry employment outcomes resulting from increased foreign competition. The impact of
low-wage import penetration on employment varies inversely with the industry's quality ladder.
In addition to this application, the quality estimates can oer insights into other theories related to
international trade, economic development and industrial organization. For instance, Amiti and Khandelwal
(2009) use the quality measures to show, consistent with the theory developed by Aghion et al. (2009), that
22the relationship between a country's pattern of quality upgrading and its level of its domestic competition
depends on the country's distance to the world quality frontier. Chari and Khandelwal (2009) use these
quality estimates to provide evidence that quality specialization also plays a role in determining rates of
protection across industries (in addition to the well-understood determinants of industry lobbying).
The approach taken in this paper also may be particularly useful in assessing the role of product
quality in inuencing trade patterns. For instance, a recent paper by Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman
(2009) develops a tractable framework for studying trade in horizontally and vertically dierentiated products
using a nested logit demand system. In their words, \the close anity between our analytical framework
and the empirical literature on discrete-choice demands makes the model ripe for empirical application."
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267 Tables
Table 1: Low-wage Countries
Afghanistan Chad Haiti Niger
Albania China India Pakistan
Angola Congo Kenya Rwanda
Armenia Equitorial Guinea Lao PDR Samoa
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Madagascar Sierra Leone
Bangladesh Gambia Malawi Sri Lanka
Benin Georgia Mali Sudan
Burkina Faso Ghana Mauritania Togo
Burundi Guinea Moldova Uganda
Cambodia Guinea‐Bissau Mozambique Vietnam
Central African Republic Guyana Nepal Yemen
Notes: Notes: The table provides the list of low‐wage countries used in the paper. Low‐wage countries 
are defined as countries with a less than 5 percent of US per capita GDP. Source: Bernard et al (2006).













Sector (SIC‐2) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
20 Food 8 37 16,881 0.39 81.4 2.04
22 Textile 85 1,642 13,304 0.15 48.7 2.62
23 Apparel 68 2,560 7,120 0.18 11.2 2.28
24 Lumber 20 262 12,634 0.20 36.3 1.81
25 Furniture 5 72 11,849 0.25 22.1 1.66
26 Paper 38 216 19,766 0.30 126.0 1.88
27 Printing 16 55 17,574 0.87 33.2 1.33
28 Chemicals 231 2,558 20,094 0.75 166.1 2.46
29 Petroleum 7 21 10,952 0.51 509.1 2.64
30 Rubber & Plastic 45 515 14,119 0.29 48.5 2.32
31 Leather 17 403 6,088 0.19 18.6 1.68
32 Stone & Ceramic 57 357 15,133 0.29 78.6 2.15
33 Primary Metal 98 1,372 16,864 0.29 157.1 2.21
34 Fabricated Metal 78 599 17,364 0.35 53.0 1.42
35 Industrial Machinery 169 1,632 21,035 0.57 63.1 2.40
36 Electronic 100 1,325 15,551 0.56 57.7 2.01
37 Transportation 43 372 23,096 0.52 68.6 2.08
38 Instruments 60 715 21,843 0.96 45.3 2.40








28Table 3: Quality Estimation Results
Statistic Mean Median 1st Quarter 3rd Quartile
OLS price coefficient ‐0.053 ‐0.003 ‐0.023 ‐0.0002
IV price coefficient ‐0.089 ‐0.009 ‐0.070 ‐0.0003
*Own price elasticity ‐1.28 ‐0.58 ‐1.44 ‐0.20
Overidentifying restrictions p‐value 0.234 0.116 0.015 0.371
1st stage F‐stat p‐value, price 0.029 0.000 0.000 0.004
1st stage F‐stat p‐value, nest share 0.031 0.000 0.000 0.006
Coefficient on conditional market share 0.42 0.46 0.09 0.81
Coefficient on population 1.17 0.68 ‐1.04 3.81
T‐statistic of quality estimates 10.29 3.89 1.34 10.59
R‐squared 0.24 0.14 0.04 0.40













29Table 4: Quality and Factor Endowments
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log (PCGDPct) 0.801 ***                       0.025 0.783 ***
0.221                           0.054 0.081
Log (K/Lct)              0.804 ***         
             0.210             
Log (Educationct)                           0.274
                          0.207
China Dummy 0.085 **
0.036
Product x Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes
R‐squared 0.20     0.21     0.32 0.49     0.49











30Table 5: Relationship between Quality and Price
Regressors (1) (2)
Qualitycht ‐0.021 *   ‐0.025 *  
0.012     0.014    
Qualitycht x Log (Ladderh) 0.005 **  0.006 ** 
0.002     0.003    
Qualitycht x BW Sigmah 9.40E‐05    












31Table 6: Quality Ladder and Industry Characteristics
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log (K/Lm) 0.133 **  0.124 **  0.138 ** 
0.051     0.057     0.060    
Log (Skillm) ‐0.015     ‐0.105     ‐0.121    
0.067     0.080     0.080    
Log (TFPm) 1.052 *   0.934     0.833    
0.600     0.577     0.580    
(Marketing Intensity)m              0.052     0.238    
             0.866     0.853    
(R&D Itensity)m              6.036 **  4.295    
             2.708     2.662    
(Broda‐Weinstein Elasticity)m              0.016     0.015    
             0.011     0.011    
(Coefficient of Variation of Unit Values)m 0.362     0.366    
0.230     0.258    
R‐squared 0.03     0.05 0.02     0.05











32Table 7: Employment Regressions
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OTHPENmt ‐0.493 *** ‐1.175 *** ‐0.475 *** ‐0.495 *** ‐1.774     ‐1.094     ‐0.979 ** ‐ 0.745    
0.157     0.406     0.132     0.157     1.295     2.869     0.436     0.545    
LWPENmt ‐1.894 *** ‐2.190 *** ‐4.643 *** ‐1.897 *** ‐7.162 ** ‐ 8.495     ‐11.700 *** ‐5.429 ***
0.256     0.360     1.194     0.267     2.983     5.511     3.010     1.753    
Log (IndLadderm) x LWPENmt 0.609 **  0.716 *** 0.600 **  0.617 **  4.620 *   5.714     2.879 *** 3.033 ** 
0.216     0.234     0.276     0.239     2.414     4.453     0.885     1.462    
Log (IndLadderm) x OTHPENmt              0.317 **                                         ‐0.535                              
             0.136                                            1.772                              
Log (K/Lm) x LWPENmt                           0.918 **                                         2.223 **              
                          0.361                                            0.932                 
Log (TFPm) x LWPENmt                                        0.329                                            7.003 *  
                                       0.870                                            3.726    
Overidentification p‐value ‐‐‐‐ 0.48     0.43     0.38     0.40
Kleibergen‐Paap F statistic ‐‐‐‐ 0.61     0.61     18.40     3.52
Industry Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R‐squared 0.112     0.120     0.124     0.112 0.013 0.009 0.018 0.020








33Table 8: Output Regressions
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OTHPENmt ‐0.508 ** ‐ 1.050 ** ‐ 0.485 ** ‐ 0.487 ** ‐ 0.430     1.159     0.231     0.321    
0.200     0.497     0.181     0.190     1.980     3.834     0.284     0.857    
LWPENmt ‐2.008 *** ‐2.243 *** ‐5.483 ** ‐ 1.978 *** ‐7.941 ** ‐ 11.100     ‐16.200 *** ‐6.619 ** 
0.354     0.404     1.942     0.281     4.016     7.713     3.593     2.603    
Log (IndLadderm) x LWPENmt 0.699 **  0.783 **  0.687 *   0.634 **  5.687 *   8.241     3.671 *** 4.439 ** 
0.307     0.308     0.367     0.301     3.227     6.300     1.371     1.971    
Log (IndLadderm) x OTHPENmt              0.252                                            ‐1.248                              
             0.186                                            2.178                              
Log (K/Lm) x LWPENmt                           1.160                                            3.562 ***             
                          0.749                                            1.379                 
Log (TFPm) x LWPENmt                                        ‐2.589 ***                                        8.813 *  
                                       0.800                                            4.973    
Overidentification p‐value ‐ ‐‐‐ 0.21    0.18     0.44    0.36
Kleibergen‐Paap F‐statistic ‐ ‐‐‐ 0.61    0.61     18.40    3.52
Industry Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R‐squared 0.181     0.185    0.195    0.184 0.006 0.003 0.016 0.015









34Table 9: Employment and Output Regressions, SIC2-Year Fixed Eects: IV
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OTHPENmt ‐0.720     ‐0.512     ‐0.499     ‐0.066     0.209     0.188    
1.234     0.496     0.675     1.529     0.345     0.699    
LWPENmt ‐4.398 *** ‐10.600 ** ‐ 4.531 *** ‐4.486 *** ‐13.000 *** ‐4.471 ** 
1.344     4.625     1.680     1.307     2.124     1.874    
Log (IndLadderm) x LWPENmt 2.706 **  2.148 **  2.764 **  3.275 **  2.082 **  3.045 ** 
1.360     0.954     1.357     1.590     1.059     1.204    
Log (K/Lm) x LWPENmt              2.121                               2.946 ***             
             1.440                               0.890                 
Log (TFPm) x LWPENmt                         6.777                            6.452   
                          4.717                               4.583    
Overidentification p‐value 0.36     0.35    0.59 0.281     0.339    0.435
Kleibergen‐Paap F‐statistic 1.13     2.91    36.40 1.13     2.91    36.4
Industry Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Two‐Digit SIC x Year FEs yes yes yes yes yes yes
R‐squared 0.006 0.020 0.009 0.010 0.0004 0.003









35Table 10: Employment Regressions, Robustness Checks
(1) Quality identified from baseline instruments and tariffs 0.501 *   2.755 ** 
0.271     1.328    
(2) Product Count 0.000     ‐0.005    
0.001     0.005    
(3) Variety Count ‐0.440     0.690    
0.348     0.948    
(4) Price 1.285     7.436 *  
1.227     4.129    
(5) Market Share 12.664 *** 21.512    
3.415     21.914    
(6) Quality excluding residuals 0.646 *** 4.571 *  
0.217     2.435    
(7) GDP‐Quality Ladder 0.609 ** 4.620 *   
0.230     2.414    
(8) Broda‐Weinstein Ladder ‐0.910 *   ‐1.591    
0.471     1.141    
(9) Exclude MFA products 0.484 ** 2.711 ** 
0.232     1.378    
(10) Range 0.639 **  3.888 ***
0.233     1.339    
(11) Inter‐quartile Range 0.650 **  5.236 ** 
0.239     2.667    
(12) Standard Deviation 0.751 **  5.061 ** 




































































































































































Price Quantity Quality Quality Best Fit
HS 8525203080































































































































































































































Price Quantity Quality Quality Best Fit
HS 6403999065
Footwear with Plastic Soles, Leather uppers
The graphs show the price, quantity and estimated quality (and 95 percent condence interval) for
countries for HS 8525203080 (\Transmission Receivers Exceeding 400 MHZ") and HS 6403999065
(\Footwear with Plastic Soles, Leather Uppers") in 2001. Countries are ordered by unit value.
37